macrohard

All candidate causes

Political-finance concentration and access

Parties rely mostly on private donations, with no cap on what one donor may give. The hypothesis is that large donors gain access that tilts spending and regulation away from broad public goods. The Independent Electoral Review found the rules risk 'undue influence through financial means'; no review documents the step to under-investment.

Open 0 of 4 support, 0 against; partly supported needs two more.

Timing Mixed Does the cause move before the symptom?
Disclosed single-donor gifts over $30,000 fell from $8.68m in 2014 to $1.35m in 2020 while the symptoms worsened, but 2022, a non-election year, recorded about $3.5m-3.8m. The series is nominal and cut off at the threshold, and access may build up as a stock, so annual flows cannot settle timing.All parties, by date received: 1.35 / 8.68 = 0.156, a fall of 84%, 2014 to 2020. Over $20,000, election years: 2023 $7.08m (131 returns); 2026 $6.98m (127) to 25 Sep. 2025 annual returns, 14 parties: $14.70m. Not joined to the 2011-22 run.Electoral Commission, Donations exceeding $30,000 (2011-2022); Electoral Commission, Donations exceeding $20,000; Health New Zealand, Health targets: 5 and 10 years of results, Q4 2025/26 (2026)
Distribution Untested Is the symptom worse where the cause is stronger?
The test needs donors coded by sector and matched to the public services that degraded. Electoral Commission returns give donor name and address only, with no sector field, so the test was not run.Electoral Commission, Donations exceeding $20,000
Peers Mixed Do comparable countries with the same cause show the same symptom?
Peers differ on donation caps: New Zealand and Denmark have none; Australia, Ireland and Canada cap donations. Uncapped Denmark scores highest on corruption perception and capped Canada fell almost as far as New Zealand. That compares perception scores, not hollowing symptoms.CPI 2015 to 2025: NZ 91 to 81 (-10); Denmark 91 to 89 (-2, no cap); Canada 83 to 75 (-8, capped); Australia 79 to 76 (-3); Ireland 75 to 76 (+1).International IDEA, Political Finance Database: donor limit to a party (secondary); Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2025 results (secondary); World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators: control of corruption (secondary)
Mechanism Mixed Does an official review document the pathway?
Official bodies document the risk, not the pathway. The Independent Electoral Review names undue influence as a risk; the Public Service Commission lists political donations and lobbying as vulnerabilities without formal checks. None finds that donations redirected capital or service spending.Independent Electoral Review, Final Report (2023); Public Service Commission, The Future of Public Service Integrity: Long-term Insights Briefing (2025); OECD, Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: New Zealand

What would settle it: Match every disclosed donation to the donor's sector and to later decisions benefiting that sector, and compare decision rates for donors with matched non-donors. A null result refutes the access pathway; a large gap supports it.

tested · the causes as data

Cite Political-finance concentration and access

macrohard.nz, “Political-finance concentration and access”, The Hollowing Index, tested 2026-09-30. https://macrohard.nz/causes/political-finance-access