{"measuredAt":"2026-09-30","causes":[{"id":"asset-renewal","name":"Under-funded renewal of long-lived public assets","mechanism":"Hospitals, schools, water networks and roads are renewed more slowly than they wear out, whether they are funded by central Budgets or by council rates. The shortfall builds up as a hidden deficit in asset condition and surfaces years later as degraded service. Weak asset management and low investment efficiency reduce what each dollar renews.","tests":{"timing":{"result":"mixed","finding":"Under-renewal is on record before the symptoms: hospital capital stock fell 42% relative to GDP from 1975 to 2022, nearly all by 2000; council renewals have been below depreciation every year since 2012/13. But the stock was near-flat from 2000 until elective waits worsened in 2016/17: a slow build-up, not a trigger.","arithmetic":"Hospital stock/GDP: 0.06738 (1975), 0.04064 (2000), 0.03932 (2022); (0.06738 - 0.03932) / 0.06738 = 41.6%. Council renewals as a share of depreciation: 74% (2019/20), 76% (2022/23), 84% (2023/24).","sources":[{"label":"Te Waihanga, Nation Building long-term infrastructure investment databook (2025)","url":"https://media.umbraco.io/te-waihanga-30-year-strategy/15ghp3hb/nation-building-long-term-infrastructure-investment-databook-final-hard-copy-1.xlsx","kind":"primary"},{"label":"Auditor-General, Insights into local government 2020, Part 2 (2021)","url":"https://ao.parliament.nz/2021/local-govt/part2.htm","kind":"primary"},{"label":"Auditor-General, Insights into local government: 2024, Part 2 (2025)","url":"https://ao.parliament.nz/2025/local-govt/part2.htm","kind":"primary"},{"label":"Health New Zealand, Health targets: 5 and 10 years of results, Q4 2025/26 (2026)","url":"https://static.info.content.health.nz/docs/publications/health-targets-5-and-10-years-of-results-q4-25-26.pdf","kind":"primary"}]},"distribution":{"result":"mixed","finding":"Where renewal rose, service improved; where it stayed low, service degraded. Water renewals roughly doubled against depreciation as protozoal compliance rose from 76% to 90%; hospital investment stayed near 0.2% of GDP and elective waits worsened most. Each contrast has a rival cause (new regulator; workforce).","arithmetic":"Water supply renewals 48% to 91% and wastewater 44% to 94% of depreciation, 2015/16 to 2023/24. Protozoal barrier 76% (2023) to 90% (2025). Hospital investment: 0.46% of GDP (1960-77), 0.20% (1990-99), 0.24% (2010-19 and 2020-22).","sources":[{"label":"Auditor-General, Insights into local government: 2024, Part 2 (2025)","url":"https://ao.parliament.nz/2025/local-govt/part2.htm","kind":"primary"},{"label":"Taumata Arowai, Drinking Water Regulation Report 2025","url":"https://www.taumataarowai.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/Network-Performance/Drinking-Water-Regulation-Report-2025.pdf","kind":"primary"},{"label":"Te Waihanga, Nation Building long-term infrastructure investment databook (2025)","url":"https://media.umbraco.io/te-waihanga-30-year-strategy/15ghp3hb/nation-building-long-term-infrastructure-investment-databook-final-hard-copy-1.xlsx","kind":"primary"},{"label":"Treasury, He Puna Hao Pātiki: Investment Statement 2025","url":"https://www.treasury.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2025-11/is25-hphp-v2.pdf","kind":"primary"},{"label":"Health New Zealand, Health targets: 5 and 10 years of results, Q4 2025/26 (2026)","url":"https://static.info.content.health.nz/docs/publications/health-targets-5-and-10-years-of-results-q4-25-26.pdf","kind":"primary"}]},"peers":{"result":"mixed","finding":"Too little capital overall is contradicted: NZ's public investment share of GDP was the OECD's highest in 2010-19 (IMF). Public capital stock/GDP fell in 13 of 22 OECD countries, 1980-2000; NZ's fall was the fourth largest, from the highest base. No peer renewal ratio was found.","arithmetic":"Net government capital stock/GDP, 1980 to 2000, 1995 prices: NZ 110.3 to 76.6 = -30.6%; UK -36.9%; Ireland -53.6%; Australia -25.7%. NZ counts public sector; AU and UK general government.","sources":[{"label":"Te Waihanga, From plans to projects: public investment management self-assessment (2025)","url":"https://media.umbraco.io/te-waihanga-30-year-strategy/5wbjv4cu/from-plans-to-projects-web.pdf","kind":"primary"},{"label":"Te Waihanga, Investment gap or efficiency gap? (2021)","url":"https://media.umbraco.io/te-waihanga-30-year-strategy/2ilbayro/investment-gap-or-efficiency-gap.pdf","kind":"primary"},{"label":"Irish Water, Business Plan: Transforming Water Services in Ireland to 2021 (2015)","url":"https://www.water.ie/sites/default/files/2024-09/Irish-Water-Business-Plan_0.pdf","kind":"primary"},{"label":"EPA Ireland, Drinking Water Report 2014","url":"https://www.epa.ie/publications/compliance--enforcement/drinking-water/drinking-water-report-2014.php","kind":"primary"},{"label":"IMF Staff Papers, Kamps, New Estimates of Government Net Capital Stocks for 22 OECD Countries (2006), Tables 1 and 2","url":"https://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/staffp/2006/01/pdf/kamps.pdf","kind":"primary"}]},"mechanism":{"result":"supports","finding":"Official reviews record it as occurring. Treasury (2025): low asset-management maturity 'continues to drive under investment in maintenance activity and a backlog'. Te Waihanga: central assets 'wearing out faster than they are being renewed'. Productivity Commission (2019): some councils are 'unable to comply'.","sources":[{"label":"Treasury, Cabinet paper EXP-25-SUB-0095: Quarterly Investment Report, June 2025","url":"https://www.treasury.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2025-12/cabinet-paper-exp-25-sub-0095.pdf","kind":"primary"},{"label":"Te Waihanga, National Infrastructure Plan, s4 Looking after what we've got","url":"https://tewaihanga.govt.nz/national-infrastructure-plan-online/4-looking-after-what-we-ve-got","kind":"primary"},{"label":"Treasury, He Puna Hao Pātiki: Investment Statement 2025","url":"https://www.treasury.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2025-11/is25-hphp-v2.pdf","kind":"primary"},{"label":"Productivity Commission, Local government funding and financing: final report (2019)","url":"https://www.treasury.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2024-05/pc-inq-lgff-final-report-local-government-funding-and-financing.pdf","kind":"primary"},{"label":"Auditor-General, Insights into local government: 2024, Part 2 (2025)","url":"https://ao.parliament.nz/2025/local-govt/part2.htm","kind":"primary"}]}},"decisive":"Renewal-to-depreciation ratios by sector over time, set against each sector's service series, holding workforce and demand constant. Councils report the ratio through the Auditor-General; central government agencies are not required to report it.","asOf":"2026-09-28","standing":"open"},{"id":"electoral-cycle-churn","name":"Policy churn: programmes reversed at and between changes of government","mechanism":"A three-year parliamentary term, annual Budgets and three-yearly land-transport policy statements mean large programmes outlast several decision cycles. Programmes are stopped, re-scoped or restarted at changes of government and within terms, which wastes planning spend and raises delivery risk. Te Waihanga says a stop-start approach 'can undermine market confidence and add costs'.","tests":{"timing":{"result":"mixed","finding":"A register of 50 decisions to cancel, repeal, defer or re-scope (47 verified) finds them at every change of government and within every term: 8, 6 and 16 within 12 months of the 2008, 2017 and 2023 elections; 5, 10 and 5 later in those terms. Elective waits worsened from 2016/17, before the largest write-offs.","arithmetic":"Register tallies: within 12 months of an election 8 + 6 + 16 = 30; later in the 2008-17, 2017-23 and current terms 5 + 10 + 5 = 20; total 50. The terms differ in length (9, 6 and about 3 years).","sources":[{"label":"NZ Legislation, Energy (Fuels, Levies, and References) Act 1989, Part 3A repeal note (2008)","url":"https://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1989/0140/13.0/whole.html","kind":"primary"},{"label":"Inland Revenue, Tax bill introduced: R&D tax credit repeal (2008)","url":"https://www.taxpolicy.ird.govt.nz/news/2008/2008-12-10-tax-bill-introduced","kind":"primary"},{"label":"NZ Transport Agency, Annual report 2017/18","url":"https://nzta.govt.nz/assets/resources/annual-report-nzta/2017-18/nzta-annual-report-2018.pdf","kind":"primary"},{"label":"Auditor-General, Auckland light rail procurement (2020)","url":"https://ao.parliament.nz/2020/auckland-light-rail","kind":"primary"},{"label":"Ministry for Culture and Heritage, Strong public media","url":"https://www.mch.govt.nz/our-work/broadcasting-and-media-sector/strong-public-media","kind":"primary"},{"label":"Ministry of Transport, Auckland Light Rail project","url":"https://www.transport.govt.nz/area-of-interest/auckland/auckland-light-rail-project","kind":"primary"},{"label":"NZ Transport Agency, East West Link project history","url":"https://nzta.govt.nz/projects/east-west-link/project-history","kind":"primary"},{"label":"Health New Zealand, Health targets: 5 and 10 years of results, Q4 2025/26 (2026)","url":"https://static.info.content.health.nz/docs/publications/health-targets-5-and-10-years-of-results-q4-25-26.pdf","kind":"primary"}]},"distribution":{"result":"mixed","finding":"Land transport, re-set by a three-yearly policy statement, holds 13 of the register's 19 infrastructure decisions, as predicted. But electricity, largely commercially run, shows a projected dry-year margin breach, and hospitals depend more on annual Budgets than on cancellations. No sector churn index exists.","arithmetic":"Register infrastructure entries: 19. Land transport 13; hospitals 3; electricity 1; broadband 1; Christchurch rebuild 1.","sources":[{"label":"Te Waihanga, From plans to projects: public investment management self-assessment (2025)","url":"https://media.umbraco.io/te-waihanga-30-year-strategy/5wbjv4cu/from-plans-to-projects-web.pdf","kind":"primary"},{"label":"Transpower, Security of Supply Assessment 2026","url":"https://static.transpower.co.nz/public/bulk-upload/documents/2026%20SOSA%20-%20Final%20Report.pdf?VersionId=Lp87J8gdqEEv1qiWPGOQrC6ax06BixFp","kind":"primary"},{"label":"NZ Transport Agency, Quarterly report Q1 2018/19","url":"https://nzta.govt.nz/assets/resources/quarterly-report/docs/q1-2018-2019.pdf","kind":"primary"}]},"peers":{"result":"mixed","finding":"Term length does not separate peers: Victoria terminated East West Link in 2015 at a cost above A$1.1b despite four-year terms. NSW wrote off A$907m of capital projects in 2022-25, 97% in the last two years; the auditor ties A$265m to strategic reviews. NZ's 2019 independent body did not stop reversals.","arithmetic":"NSW write-offs A$25.2m + 436.4m + 445.4m = 907.0m; (436.4 + 445.4) / 907.0 = 97%. East West Link: above A$1.1b less about A$0.32b resale = at least A$0.78b.","sources":[{"label":"Victorian Auditor-General's Office, East West Link Project (2015)","url":"https://www.audit.vic.gov.au/report/east-west-link-project/?section=","kind":"primary"},{"label":"Parliament of Australia, Parliamentary Library: Four-year parliamentary terms (2024)","url":"https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_departments/Parliamentary_Library/Research/FlagPost/2024/April/4YearTerms","kind":"primary"},{"label":"Treasury, Cabinet paper: a new independent infrastructure body (2018)","url":"https://www.treasury.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2018-10/infrastructure-4009864.pdf","kind":"primary"},{"label":"Audit Office of NSW, Capital projects 2025, ch. 7 Project cost write-offs","url":"https://www.audit.nsw.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/Tabling%20report%20-%20Capital%20Projects%202025.pdf","kind":"primary"}]},"mechanism":{"result":"mixed","finding":"Official sources state a risk, not a measured pathway: stop-start planning 'can undermine market confidence and add costs'. None quantifies the total cost. Reported spend on stopped programmes: public media merger $19.6m, iReX $671m in all, LGWM $180.7m; iReX's estimate had doubled first.","arithmetic":"iReX cost estimate: 2,954 / 1,450 = 2.04 times, June 2021 to November 2023. No sunk-cost figure was found for the 2008 or 2017 transitions; records are sparse before routine release of Cabinet papers from 2019.","sources":[{"label":"Te Waihanga, National Infrastructure Plan, s1 Finding common ground","url":"https://tewaihanga.govt.nz/national-infrastructure-plan-online/1-finding-common-ground","kind":"primary"},{"label":"Te Waihanga, From plans to projects: public investment management self-assessment (2025)","url":"https://media.umbraco.io/te-waihanga-30-year-strategy/5wbjv4cu/from-plans-to-projects-web.pdf","kind":"primary"},{"label":"Ministry for Culture and Heritage, Strong public media","url":"https://www.mch.govt.nz/our-work/broadcasting-and-media-sector/strong-public-media","kind":"primary"},{"label":"KiwiRail, KiwiRail concludes iReX ferry replacement project (2025)","url":"https://www.kiwirail.co.nz/media/kiwirail-concludes-irex-ferry-replacement-project/","kind":"primary"},{"label":"NZ Transport Agency, OIA response 15198 (2024)","url":"https://nzta.govt.nz/assets/About-us/docs/oia-2024/oia-15198-response-letter.pdf","kind":"primary"},{"label":"Treasury, Cabinet paper CAB-23-SUB-0487: Crown support for Project iReX (2023)","url":"https://www.treasury.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2024-05/project-irex-4914547.pdf","kind":"primary"}]}},"decisive":"A register of every Crown project over $50m with each decision date and the spend at that point. Compare write-offs within 12 months of every election with other months, across every term, and against cost-estimate growth, then against Australian states.","asOf":"2026-09-28","standing":"open"},{"id":"housing-cost","name":"Housing cost and land-supply constraint","mechanism":"Restrictive land supply, slow servicing of land and high building costs make housing expensive relative to incomes. The hypothesis is that high housing cost pushes citizens, especially people aged 20-39, to leave, and loads demand onto public provision. The official record documents the cost pathway, not a housing-to-emigration pathway.","tests":{"timing":{"result":"contradicts","finding":"Departures should rise after price-to-income rises; they did not. New Zealand's price-to-income index peaked at 136.1 in 2021 and fell 24% by 2025, while citizen departures rose from 52,036 (2022) to 67,352 (2024). Over 2004-2025, excluding 2020-21, departures and the index are negatively correlated (r = -0.34).","arithmetic":"103.53 / 136.13 = 0.761, a 24% fall, 2021 to 2025. Pearson r, n = 20: departures against the index -0.34 (same year), -0.11 (one-year lag), +0.09 (two-year lag); departures to Australia -0.58.","sources":[{"label":"OECD, Analytical house prices: price-to-income index (HPI_YDH), 2000-2025","url":"https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.ECO.MPD,DSD_AN_HOUSE_PRICES@DF_HOUSE_PRICES,1.0/AUS+NZL+IRL+DNK+CAN.A.HPI_YDH.?startPeriod=2000&dimensionAtObservation=AllDimensions&format=csvfile","kind":"primary"},{"label":"Stats NZ, Net migration loss to Australia in 2025 (2026)","url":"https://www.stats.govt.nz/news/net-migration-loss-to-australia-in-2025/","kind":"primary"}]},"distribution":{"result":"mixed","finding":"Stats NZ publishes NZ-citizen departures by region, assigned from the address nearest the departure date. Year to Feb 2024, departures per 1,000 residents ran from 5.2 (West Coast) to 17.8 (Auckland). Across 16 regions the link to house price to income is weak and not significant (r = +0.27). Tenure is not published.","arithmetic":"Rate = NZ-citizen departures / 2023 Census residents x 1,000: Auckland 29,505 / 1,656,486 = 17.8; West Coast 174 / 33,390 = 5.2. Pearson r = +0.27 (p = 0.32), Spearman +0.25 (p = 0.34), n = 16.","sources":[{"label":"Stats NZ, Estimated migration by direction, citizenship and NZ area (Infoshare, Feb 2024)","url":"https://figure.nz/table/5RyfaufEPdSRkdvq","kind":"secondary"},{"label":"Stats NZ, 2023 Census usually resident population counts by region","url":"https://www.stats.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/2023-Census-population-counts-by-ethnic-group-age-and-Maori-descent-and-dwelling-counts/Downloads/2023-Census-national-and-subnational-usually-resident-population-counts-and-dwelling-counts.xlsx","kind":"primary"},{"label":"HUD, Local Housing Statistics Dashboard (median house price to income, Jun 2023)","url":"https://catalogue.data.govt.nz/dataset/7445503d-5e59-43f3-a3bd-862d2b8a1e3e","kind":"primary"}]},"peers":{"result":"mixed","finding":"Price-to-income also rose steeply in Canada, Australia and Denmark from 2000 to 2021 without comparable citizen exit. Ireland's emigration peaked in 2012 as its house prices collapsed, rose again in 2022-24 with prices steady, then eased in 2025-26 as its price-to-income ratio rose: a weak fit at best.","arithmetic":"Price-to-income 2021 / 2000: NZ 2.24; Canada 2.06; Australia 1.66; Denmark 1.39; Ireland 0.92. Ireland emigration per 1,000: 18.1 (2012), 13.0 (2024), 11.3 (2026) = 62.5 ÷ 5,525.6 × 1,000; price-to-income 112.7 (2024), 118.0 (2025).","sources":[{"label":"OECD, Analytical house prices: price-to-income index (HPI_YDH), 2000-2025","url":"https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.ECO.MPD,DSD_AN_HOUSE_PRICES@DF_HOUSE_PRICES,1.0/AUS+NZL+IRL+DNK+CAN.A.HPI_YDH.?startPeriod=2000&dimensionAtObservation=AllDimensions&format=csvfile","kind":"primary"},{"label":"Central Statistics Office Ireland, PEA15 Annual Population Change","url":"https://ws.cso.ie/public/api.restful/PxStat.Data.Cube_API.ReadDataset/PEA15/CSV/1.0/en","kind":"primary"}]},"mechanism":{"result":"mixed","finding":"Official reviews document the cost pathway: land supply, servicing and building costs. None links housing cost to emigration. The Productivity Commission (2015) records councils rationing trunk infrastructure to stay within debt limits, so housing cost is partly downstream of asset funding.","sources":[{"label":"Productivity Commission, Housing affordability inquiry: final report (2012)","url":"https://www.treasury.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2024-05/pc-inq-ha-final-report-v5.pdf","kind":"primary"},{"label":"Productivity Commission, Using land for housing: final report (2015)","url":"https://www.treasury.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2024-05/pc-inq-ulh-using-land-for-housing-final-report-v2.pdf","kind":"primary"},{"label":"OECD, Economic Surveys: New Zealand 2019, ch. 3 housing policy","url":"https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-economic-surveys-new-zealand-2019_b0b94dbd-en/full-report/component-7.html","kind":"primary"}]}},"decisive":"Link departures to prior tenure and region in the Stats NZ Integrated Data Infrastructure, and test whether renters and residents of high price-to-income regions leave at higher rates, controlling for age, occupation and the NZ-Australia unemployment gap.","asOf":"2026-09-30","standing":"open"},{"id":"productivity-wage-gap","name":"Productivity and wage gap with Australia","mechanism":"New Zealand's labour productivity is about a third lower than Australia's and capital per hour worked about half, so real wages are lower. With free movement across the Tasman, the Productivity Commission finds higher Australian wages 'attract continuing net outflows of New Zealand workers'. The same low base limits the tax base for public goods.","tests":{"timing":{"result":"contradicts","finding":"The gap narrowed before the exit surge. Australia's average wage relative to New Zealand's fell from 1.398 (2000) to 1.183 (2025), yet departures to Australia rose from 27,876 (2022) to 41,083 (2025). Over 2004-2025 they track the unemployment gap (r = +0.68), not the wage ratio (r = +0.24, not significant).","arithmetic":"Wage ratio AUS / NZL: 58,708.9 / 41,985.5 = 1.398 (2000); 72,018.4 / 60,896.2 = 1.183 (2025). Pearson r, n = 20 (2004-2019, 2022-2025, departures to Australia): wage ratio +0.24; NZ minus AU unemployment +0.68.","sources":[{"label":"OECD, Average annual wages, USD PPP constant prices (AV_AN_WAGE), 2000-2025","url":"https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.ELS.SAE,DSD_EARNINGS@AV_AN_WAGE,/AUS+NZL+IRL+DNK+CAN..USD_PPP....?startPeriod=2000&dimensionAtObservation=AllDimensions&format=csvfile","kind":"primary"},{"label":"OECD, Harmonised unemployment rate, annual, Australia and New Zealand, 2004-2025","url":"https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD_LFS@DF_IALFS_UNE_M,1.0/AUS+NZL.UNE_LF_M.PT_LF_SUB._Z.Y._T.Y_GE15..A?startPeriod=2004&dimensionAtObservation=AllDimensions&format=csvfile","kind":"primary"},{"label":"Stats NZ, Net migration loss to Australia in 2025 (2026)","url":"https://www.stats.govt.nz/news/net-migration-loss-to-australia-in-2025/","kind":"primary"},{"label":"Reserve Bank of NZ, Analytical Note AN2016/02: Why the drivers of migration matter (2016)","url":"https://www.rbnz.govt.nz/-/media/48863f8d41134e59913b8527a87e37c4.ashx","kind":"primary"}]},"distribution":{"result":"untested","finding":"The test needs exit by occupation set against occupation-level NZ-Australia wage gaps, for example for doctors, nurses and engineers. Public migration data give only age, sex, citizenship and an Australia or rest-of-world split.","sources":[{"label":"Stats NZ, Net migration loss to Australia in 2025 (2026)","url":"https://www.stats.govt.nz/news/net-migration-loss-to-australia-in-2025/","kind":"primary"}]},"peers":{"result":"mixed","finding":"Only New Zealand pairs free movement with a larger, higher-wage neighbour on this scale. Ireland, the nearest analogue, now has wages near Australia's, yet its emigration still swings with its own labour market (18.1 per 1,000 in 2012, 10.1 in 2020, 11.3 in 2026), which favours a cyclical reading over a level gap.","arithmetic":"2025 average wages, USD PPP: Denmark 78,090; Australia 72,018; Ireland 70,113; Canada 67,901; NZ 60,896. NZ / Australia = 0.846.","sources":[{"label":"OECD, Average annual wages, USD PPP constant prices (AV_AN_WAGE), 2000-2025","url":"https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.ELS.SAE,DSD_EARNINGS@AV_AN_WAGE,/AUS+NZL+IRL+DNK+CAN..USD_PPP....?startPeriod=2000&dimensionAtObservation=AllDimensions&format=csvfile","kind":"primary"},{"label":"Central Statistics Office Ireland, PEA15 Annual Population Change","url":"https://ws.cso.ie/public/api.restful/PxStat.Data.Cube_API.ReadDataset/PEA15/CSV/1.0/en","kind":"primary"}]},"mechanism":{"result":"supports","finding":"The Productivity Commission (2013) states that higher Australian productivity lifts real wages, 'which in turn attract continuing net outflows'. Its 2023 report puts capital per hour worked at about half of Australia's. The Reserve Bank (2016) finds trans-Tasman flows respond to relative labour-market conditions.","sources":[{"label":"Productivity Commission, Investigating New Zealand-Australia productivity differences (2013)","url":"https://www.treasury.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2024-05/pc-wp-nzpc-nz-australia-productivity-working-paper-2013.pdf","kind":"primary"},{"label":"Productivity Commission, Productivity by the numbers (2023)","url":"https://www.treasury.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2024-05/pc-rp-pbtn-2023-digital-final-3-july.pdf","kind":"primary"},{"label":"Reserve Bank of NZ, Analytical Note AN2016/02: Why the drivers of migration matter (2016)","url":"https://www.rbnz.govt.nz/-/media/48863f8d41134e59913b8527a87e37c4.ashx","kind":"primary"}]}},"decisive":"Model quarterly citizen departures to Australia on the real wage ratio and the unemployment gap. If the wage ratio adds nothing once the gap is included, the productivity gap sets only the baseline outflow, not the surge.","asOf":"2026-09-30","standing":"open"},{"id":"public-service-capability","name":"Erosion of public-service capability and institutional memory","mechanism":"When agencies lack in-house people and systems to plan, maintain and commission assets and services, asset condition goes unknown, renewals are deferred and delivery is bought in from contractors whose knowledge leaves with them. Te Waihanga finds capability and capacity are 'the biggest constraints' on asset-management maturity.","tests":{"timing":{"result":"mixed","finding":"Headcount measures capacity, not capability. Public Service FTE rose in each period: 53.5% (2000-10), 28.3% (2010-20) and 9.6% (2020-25). The series that fit capability, tenure and contractor share, start in 2016 and 2018; tenure fell to 2024 and rose in 2025 as contractor share fell, so precedence cannot be tested.","arithmetic":"FTE at 30 June: 29,020.5 (2000); 44,553.6 (2010); 57,148.6 (2020); 62,654.5 (2025); 64,534.7 (Mar 2026). Tenure 9.5 years (2016), 8.0 (2024), 8.3 (2025). Contractor share of spend 13.4% (2018), 14.5% (2022), 5.3% (2025), 5.4% (Mar 2026).","sources":[{"label":"Public Service Commission, Public Service workforce five-year trend data, 2000-2026","url":"https://www.publicservice.govt.nz/assets/Five-year-trend.csv","kind":"primary"},{"label":"Public Service Commission, contractor and consultant share of workforce spend, quarterly","url":"https://www.publicservice.govt.nz/assets/Census/Workforce-Data-CSV-files-2026/CC-share-quarterly.csv","kind":"primary"},{"label":"Public Service Commission, Public Service Census: mobility","url":"https://www.publicservice.govt.nz/data/public-service-census/capability-mobility/mobility","kind":"primary"}]},"distribution":{"result":"mixed","finding":"Across 22 departments, change in OIA on-time share 2018 to 2025-26 shows no significant link to contractor share, staffing change or staff turnover. Most departments now answer 97% or more on time (19 of 22), so this outcome is too compressed to detect an effect. Kiwis Count is not tested by agency.","arithmetic":"Spearman rho, n = 22: contractor share change -0.07 (p 0.76); FTE change +0.08 (p 0.72); mean unplanned turnover +0.31 (p 0.16). Share = contractor and consultant spend / (FTE x average salary + that spend), a derived measure.","sources":[{"label":"Public Service Commission, OIA statistics half-year workbooks (Jan-Jun 2018, Jul-Dec 2018, Jul-Dec 2025, Jan-Jun 2026)","url":"https://www.publicservice.govt.nz/data/oia-statistics","kind":"primary"},{"label":"Public Service Commission, workforce data drilldown by agency","url":"https://www.publicservice.govt.nz/assets/Data-Drilldownin-3.csv","kind":"primary"},{"label":"Public Service Commission, contractor and consultant spend by agency, quarterly","url":"https://www.publicservice.govt.nz/assets/Census/Workforce-Data-CSV-files-2026/CC-agency-quarterly.csv","kind":"primary"}]},"peers":{"result":"mixed","finding":"Australia's 2019 public service review found contractors increasingly doing core in-house work, the same cause in a peer. Australia is also the main destination of New Zealand's citizen exit, so the same cause did not produce the same exit symptom there. Service-quality data across peers were not assembled.","sources":[{"label":"Parliament of Australia, Senate committee report, ch. 3, labour hire","url":"https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Legal_and_Constitutional_Affairs/DV/Report/Section?id=committees%2Freportsen%2F024628%2F77930","kind":"primary"},{"label":"Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (Australia), Independent Review of the APS (2019)","url":"https://www.pmc.gov.au/resources/independent-review-australian-public-service","kind":"primary"}]},"mechanism":{"result":"mixed","finding":"Official reviews state a vulnerability, not a pathway to the symptoms. Te Waihanga names capability as the biggest constraint on asset management; the Auditor-General (2017) says entities 'may not always have the expertise'. No official review attributes the symptoms to public-service capability.","sources":[{"label":"Te Waihanga, Taking care of tomorrow today: asset management state of play (2024)","url":"https://tewaihanga.govt.nz/our-work/research-insights/taking-care-of-tomorrow-today","kind":"primary"},{"label":"Auditor-General, Reflections from our audits: investment and asset management (2017), Part 5","url":"https://ao.parliament.nz/2017/asset-reflections/part5.htm","kind":"primary"}]}},"decisive":"An agency panel from 2018: changes in contractor share, unplanned turnover and tenure set against each agency's own service measures, with a lag of one to three years. The hypothesis predicts that agencies losing capability first degrade first.","asOf":"2026-09-30","standing":"open"},{"id":"demographic-ageing","name":"Demographic ageing and fiscal pressure crowding out public goods","mechanism":"An older population raises tax-funded superannuation and health spending faster than the working-age tax base grows, leaving less fiscal room for capital and other services. Treasury projects NZ Superannuation rising from 5.1% to about 8% of GDP and health from 7.1% to about 10% by 2065.","tests":{"timing":{"result":"mixed","finding":"The pressure builds gradually: NZ Superannuation rose from 3.9% of GDP (2006) to 5.1% (2025), with 0.2 points more forecast by 2031; the 65+ share went from 13.0% (2010) to 17.6% (2025). The symptoms moved more abruptly. Health spending rose rather than being crowded out, so waits fit ageing demand, not tested here.","arithmetic":"NZ Superannuation +1.2 points of GDP over 19 years = about 0.06 points a year; a further +0.2 points forecast to 2030/31. 65+ share 13.0% to 17.6% = +4.6 points, 2010 to 2025.","sources":[{"label":"Treasury, He Tirohanga Mokopuna 2025: Long-term Fiscal Statement","url":"https://www.treasury.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2025-09/ltfs-2025.pdf","kind":"primary"},{"label":"Treasury, Pre-election Economic and Fiscal Update 2026 (29 Sep 2026)","url":"https://www.treasury.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2026-09/prefu26.pdf","kind":"primary"},{"label":"World Bank, World Development Indicators: population ages 65 and above, 2000-2025","url":"https://api.worldbank.org/v2/country/NZL;AUS;IRL;DNK;CAN/indicator/SP.POP.65UP.TO.ZS?format=json&date=2000:2025&per_page=200","kind":"primary"},{"label":"Health New Zealand, Health targets: 5 and 10 years of results, Q4 2025/26 (2026)","url":"https://static.info.content.health.nz/docs/publications/health-targets-5-and-10-years-of-results-q4-25-26.pdf","kind":"primary"}]},"distribution":{"result":"mixed","finding":"Across 19 Health NZ districts the share of elective patients waiting under 120 days shows no age gradient: rank correlation with the 65+ share is +0.23 (p = 0.35) and -0.02 (p = 0.94) with its 2018-25 growth. Council infrastructure was not tested.","arithmetic":"Spearman rho, n = 19 districts (Capital and Coast joined with Hutt Valley): share under 120 days at June 2026 vs 65+ share 2025 = +0.23; vs 2018-25 change = -0.02. The 120-day field is a proxy for the target.","sources":[{"label":"Health NZ, Waitlist detail extract Q4 2025/26 (Elective Waitlist sheet)","url":"https://static.info.content.health.nz/docs/publications/waitlist-detail-extract-q4-2025-26.xlsx","kind":"primary"},{"label":"Health NZ, Health targets factsheets Q1 2025/26 (elective target definition)","url":"https://static.info.content.health.nz/docs/publications/health-targets-factsheets-Q1-2025-26.pdf","kind":"primary"},{"label":"Stats NZ, Subnational population estimates by health district (POPES_SUB_002)","url":"https://explore.data.stats.govt.nz/","kind":"primary"}]},"peers":{"result":"contradicts","finding":"New Zealand is not unusually old or ageing unusually fast. Its 65+ share in 2025 (17.6%) was below Denmark, Canada and Australia, and it aged no faster than they did from 2010. Older peers such as Denmark do not show New Zealand's symptoms.","arithmetic":"65+ share change 2010 to 2025: NZ 13.0 to 17.6 (+4.6); Australia +4.6; Denmark +4.6; Ireland +4.8; Canada +6.2.","sources":[{"label":"World Bank, World Development Indicators: population ages 65 and above, 2000-2025","url":"https://api.worldbank.org/v2/country/NZL;AUS;IRL;DNK;CAN/indicator/SP.POP.65UP.TO.ZS?format=json&date=2000:2025&per_page=200","kind":"primary"}]},"mechanism":{"result":"mixed","finding":"Treasury documents a prospective pathway: pressures that would require other spending to fall from about 13% to 5% of GDP by 2065. It does not document ageing as the present cause of under-investment, and finds its projections 'not particularly sensitive to different rates of capital investment'.","sources":[{"label":"Treasury, He Tirohanga Mokopuna 2025: Long-term Fiscal Statement","url":"https://www.treasury.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2025-09/ltfs-2025.pdf","kind":"primary"}]}},"decisive":"A district panel from 2014: elective performance and hospital demand against the 65+ share and its growth, and a peer panel of ageing against public investment and waiting times. Older, faster-ageing places should degrade most.","asOf":"2026-09-30","standing":"open"},{"id":"political-finance-access","name":"Political-finance concentration and access","mechanism":"Parties rely mostly on private donations, with no cap on what one donor may give. The hypothesis is that large donors gain access that tilts spending and regulation away from broad public goods. The Independent Electoral Review found the rules risk 'undue influence through financial means'; no review documents the step to under-investment.","tests":{"timing":{"result":"mixed","finding":"Disclosed single-donor gifts over $30,000 fell from $8.68m in 2014 to $1.35m in 2020 while the symptoms worsened, but 2022, a non-election year, recorded about $3.5m-3.8m. The series is nominal and cut off at the threshold, and access may build up as a stock, so annual flows cannot settle timing.","arithmetic":"All parties, by date received: 1.35 / 8.68 = 0.156, a fall of 84%, 2014 to 2020. Over $20,000, election years: 2023 $7.08m (131 returns); 2026 $6.98m (127) to 25 Sep. 2025 annual returns, 14 parties: $14.70m. Not joined to the 2011-22 run.","sources":[{"label":"Electoral Commission, Donations exceeding $30,000 (2011-2022)","url":"https://elections.nz/democracy-in-nz/political-parties-in-new-zealand/donations-exceeding-20000/donations-exceeding-30000","kind":"primary"},{"label":"Electoral Commission, Donations exceeding $20,000","url":"https://elections.nz/democracy-in-nz/political-parties-in-new-zealand/donations-exceeding-20000","kind":"primary"},{"label":"Health New Zealand, Health targets: 5 and 10 years of results, Q4 2025/26 (2026)","url":"https://static.info.content.health.nz/docs/publications/health-targets-5-and-10-years-of-results-q4-25-26.pdf","kind":"primary"}]},"distribution":{"result":"untested","finding":"The test needs donors coded by sector and matched to the public services that degraded. Electoral Commission returns give donor name and address only, with no sector field, so the test was not run.","sources":[{"label":"Electoral Commission, Donations exceeding $20,000","url":"https://elections.nz/democracy-in-nz/political-parties-in-new-zealand/donations-exceeding-20000","kind":"primary"}]},"peers":{"result":"mixed","finding":"Peers differ on donation caps: New Zealand and Denmark have none; Australia, Ireland and Canada cap donations. Uncapped Denmark scores highest on corruption perception and capped Canada fell almost as far as New Zealand. That compares perception scores, not hollowing symptoms.","arithmetic":"CPI 2015 to 2025: NZ 91 to 81 (-10); Denmark 91 to 89 (-2, no cap); Canada 83 to 75 (-8, capped); Australia 79 to 76 (-3); Ireland 75 to 76 (+1).","sources":[{"label":"International IDEA, Political Finance Database: donor limit to a party","url":"https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/question?question_id=9206&database_theme=302","kind":"secondary"},{"label":"Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2025 results","url":"https://files.transparencycdn.org/images/CPI2025_Results.xlsx","kind":"secondary"},{"label":"World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators: control of corruption","url":"https://api.worldbank.org/v2/country/NZL;AUS;IRL;DNK;CAN/indicator/GOV_WGI_CC.EST?source=3&date=2012:2025&format=json&per_page=200","kind":"secondary"}]},"mechanism":{"result":"mixed","finding":"Official bodies document the risk, not the pathway. The Independent Electoral Review names undue influence as a risk; the Public Service Commission lists political donations and lobbying as vulnerabilities without formal checks. None finds that donations redirected capital or service spending.","sources":[{"label":"Independent Electoral Review, Final Report (2023)","url":"https://www.justice.govt.nz/assets/Documents/Publications/Independent-Electoral-Review-Final-Report-November-2023.pdf","kind":"primary"},{"label":"Public Service Commission, The Future of Public Service Integrity: Long-term Insights Briefing (2025)","url":"https://www.publicservice.govt.nz/assets/The-Future-of-Public-Service-Integrity-LTIB-final.pdf","kind":"primary"},{"label":"OECD, Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: New Zealand","url":"https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/anti-corruption-and-integrity-outlook-2026_0c8910f8-en/new-zealand_521c4ca1-en.html","kind":"primary"}]}},"decisive":"Match every disclosed donation to the donor's sector and to later decisions benefiting that sector, and compare decision rates for donors with matched non-donors. A null result refutes the access pathway; a large gap supports it.","asOf":"2026-09-30","standing":"open"},{"id":"state-capture","name":"State capture by a private network","mechanism":"A private network gains control over appointments, rule-making or spending and redirects state resources to itself, degrading public goods. Official reviews describe this only as a risk: the Public Service Commission notes concern about 'disproportionate influence through an inside track' and 'regulatory capture'. No official finding establishes that capture has occurred.","tests":{"timing":{"result":"untested","finding":"No direct measure of capture exists. The Corruption Perceptions Index and the World Bank governance indicators are perception indices built from overlapping expert surveys, not measures of control, so whether the cause moved before the symptom cannot be tested.","sources":[{"label":"Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2025 results","url":"https://files.transparencycdn.org/images/CPI2025_Results.xlsx","kind":"secondary"},{"label":"World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators: control of corruption","url":"https://api.worldbank.org/v2/country/NZL;AUS;IRL;DNK;CAN/indicator/GOV_WGI_CC.EST?source=3&date=2012:2025&format=json&per_page=200","kind":"secondary"}]},"distribution":{"result":"untested","finding":"No official finding places the degradation where a private network gains, and none rules it out. The demand that public elective waits create for private surgery and health insurance has not been examined.","sources":[]},"peers":{"result":"mixed","finding":"New Zealand's fall in perceived integrity is shared by high-scoring peers that are not considered captured, so it is not unique. The comparison is of perception scores, not of hollowing symptoms, so it neither confirms nor refutes capture.","arithmetic":"CPI 2015 to 2025: NZ 91 to 81 (-10); Sweden 89 to 80 (-9); Canada 83 to 75 (-8); Norway 88 to 81 (-7).","sources":[{"label":"Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2025 results","url":"https://files.transparencycdn.org/images/CPI2025_Results.xlsx","kind":"secondary"},{"label":"Public Service Commission, The Future of Public Service Integrity: Long-term Insights Briefing (2025)","url":"https://www.publicservice.govt.nz/assets/The-Future-of-Public-Service-Integrity-LTIB-final.pdf","kind":"primary"}]},"mechanism":{"result":"mixed","finding":"Openings are documented: no lobbying regulation, no beneficial-ownership register, and Public Service Commission concern about an inside track and revolving-door moves. Every official review stops at vulnerability; none finds a network controlling appointments or spending.","sources":[{"label":"OECD, Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: New Zealand","url":"https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/anti-corruption-and-integrity-outlook-2026_0c8910f8-en/new-zealand_521c4ca1-en.html","kind":"primary"},{"label":"Public Service Commission, The Future of Public Service Integrity: Long-term Insights Briefing (2025)","url":"https://www.publicservice.govt.nz/assets/The-Future-of-Public-Service-Integrity-LTIB-final.pdf","kind":"primary"}]}},"decisive":"Look for control, not perception: an official finding of improper influence over a spending or regulatory decision, or beneficiaries winning decisions at rates above matched non-beneficiaries. Continued absence as symptoms deepen would refute it as the main cause.","asOf":"2026-09-28","standing":"open"}]}